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(L. A. Nos. 20514, 20515.

In Bank. July 30, 1948.]

JAMES A. MORAN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. BOARD
OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF
CALIFOUNIA et al., Defendants and Appellants.
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[la, Ib] Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Mandamus-Time
for Filing Petition.-A petition for writ of mandate to review
an order of an administrative board was filed within the time
allowed by Gov. Code, § 11523, although it was filed more than
30 days after the effective date of the board's decision, where
on that date petitioner requested the shorthand reporter of
thr board to prepare the record of the proceedings held therein,
this being tantamount to a request of "the agency" within the
code section, and where the petition was filed within five days
after delivery of the record to petitioner.
[2] Pleading-Admissions-By Failure to Deny.-One failing to
deny new factual matter contained in an amended petition is
deemed to have admitted it.
[S] Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Rearing.-In n mandamus proceeding to review an order of a state-wide administrative board, the trial court is authorized to exercise its
independent judgment on the evidence.
[4] Physicians-Licenses-Suspension-Review.-In a mandamus
proceeding to review an order of the Board of Medical ExulJIiners suspending a physician's license for having prescribed
narcotics to addicts, thp evidence sustained the court's finding
that petitioner's treatment of each patient was proper in view
of its emergency character and the presence of an incurable
disease.
[6] Evidence-Judicial Notice-Realth.-It is common knowledge
that some sufferers from severe cases of asthma and arthritis
spend many years vainly speking permanent relief and cure.
[6] Physicians-Licenses-Suspension-Review-Parties. - In the
absence of kgislativ\' prllvision to the contrary, the members
of the Board of Mrflical Examiner!; Ilre proper, but not neee~
SIlry, partics to n lIl:mdamus proceC'ding to review an order (If
th., bourn suSpt'!I(UII!~ u physician's li.·("n!le.
[2] St'!: 21 Oa1.Jur. 155, ISS; 41 Am.Jur.431.
[4] ~l'e 20 Oa1.Jur.1oo5; 4] Am.Jur. 172.
McK. Dig. References: [l] Administrative Law, § 20; f2] PIt'/uling. §lan; pq Administrntivp Lnw, §22; [-1. (lJ Physicians, ~JO;
. [5] Evidence, § 92; [7] Administrative Law, ~ 2-!.
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[7] Administrative Law - Judicial Review - Costs. - Where R n
order of the Board of M~diMl Examiners Bllspeniling a physi.
cian's license was annulled in a mandamus procp.eding, he is
entitled to recover as costs the expense of preparing a record
of the board proceedings. (Code Civ. Proe., § 1094.5.)

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order disallowing an item of
costs for transcript of proceedings before an administrative
board. Henry M. Willis and Allen W. Ashburn, Judges. Judgment affirmed j order modified and affirmed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel state medical board to
annul an order of suspension of license to practice as a physician. Judgment for petitioner affirmed.
Joseph Scott and Cuthbert J .. Scott for Petitioner and Appellant.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and J. Albert Hutchinson, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendants and Appellants.
SCHAUER, J.-In February, 1944, respondent Board of
1\Iedical Examiners (hereinafter termed the board) licensed
petitioner James A. Moran (hereinafter called petitioner) to
practice medicine and surgery in California. Thereafter petitioner developed a general practice of his profession at Carmel,
in Monterey County. In May, 1946, a special agent of the
board filed a written accusation charging petitioner with three
counts of unprofessional conduct in the prescription of certain narcotics and asking that the board discipline petitioner.
Following a hearing the board, on Augnst 16, 1946, filed its
written decision and order that petitioner was guilty as
charged, that his medical certificate be suspended for one year,
that for five years immediately following the year of suspension petitioller be on probation and neither have in possession
nor prescribe narcotics, and that the decision "shall be effective immediately upon delivery of a copy thereof" to petitioner.
On September 26, 1946, petitioner filed in the superior
court in Los Angeles his petition for a writ of mandate asking
that the court review the proceedings beforp. the board, set
aside the decision and order of tIle board, and order that
petitioner's license to practice medieine in this state be re-
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stored; an alternative writ was issued the same day. The individual members of the board, as well as the board itself, are
named as parties respondent in both the petition and the
alternative writ. On October 16, 1946, the board by way of
return filed it'S demurrer and answer to the petition for the
writ; and there was also filed in the superior court a transcript
of the proceedings before the board. That court, after a hearing but with no evidence other than the transcript of the
board proceedings, overruled the demurrer, made findings in
favor of petitioner, and ordered that the decision of the
board be annulled, that petitioner's medical certificate be
restored, and that petitioner recover his costs. The board has
appealed from the judgment annulling its decision (L. A.
20514) and petitioner has appealed from the order of the
court taxing his costs at only $31.60 and disallowing an item
of $117 paid by him as the cost of the transcript of the proceedings before the board (L. A. 20515). We have conclnded
that upon the record and the applicable law the judgment
of the trial court must be affirmed and that petitioner is entitled to recover the item of costs which was disallowed.
.AB grounds requiring reversal of the trial court'. judgment
in petitioner's favor, the board contends:
1. That the petition for mandamus was not filed within the
time anowed by l'tatute.
2. That the record of the proceedings before the board supported its decision, and the trial court had no power to set
aside such decision.
1. Time for Piling Mandamus Petition
Section 11523 of the Government Code provides that judicial review of the board's decision "may be had by filing a
petition for a writ of mandate in accordance with the proyisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Except as otherwise
provided in this section any such petition shall be filed within
30 days after the last day on which reconsideration can be
ordered. . . . The complete record of the proceedings, or such
part!'; thereof as are designated by the petitioner, shall be
prepared by the agency and shall be delivered to petitioner,
within 30 days· after a request therefor by him, upon the
payment of the expense of preparation and certification
thereof...-. Where petitioner, within 10 days after the last
day on which recomideration ean be ordered, requests the
·Prior to the 1947 amellfhnl'nt to R('\·tioll llii!l3 the period W:l!'l
days. "
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agency to prepare all or any part of the record the time within
which a petition may be filed shan be extended until five days
after its delivery to him. . . ."
Section 11518 of the same code states that the board's decision "shall be in writing," and section 11519 provides that
the "decision shall become effective 30 days after it is delivered
or mailed to respondent {petitioner herein] unless: ... the
agency itseJf [here, the board] nrdcrs that the decision shan
become effective sooner. . . ." Section 11521 provides that
the U power to order a reconsideration shall expire 30 days
after the delivery or mailing of a decision to respondent [petitioner herein], or on the date set by the agency itself as the
effective date of the decision if such date occurs prior to the
expiration of the 30~day period. "
[la] In this case the boardordercd that its decision be
effective upon delivery of the written decision to petitioner.
Delivery took place on .Augul:1t 19, 1946, and consequently the
board's power to order a reconsideration expired on the same
date, and the time allowed petitioner to file this mandamus
proceeding expired 30 days later unless extended by other
provisions of section 11523 of the Government Code. As noted
hereinabove, the mandamus petition was filed September 26,
1946, or subsequent to the expiration of such 30-day period.
Petitioner urges, however, that within 10 days of AUgURt 19,
1946, he "reqnested the agency to prepare ... the rel'ord"
of the proceedings b~fore it, that he filed this petition for
mandamus within five days after delivery of the record to him,
and that therefore he acted within the time allowed by the
provisions of section 11523, quoted hereinabove.
As originally filed on September 2G, 1946, the petition for
mandamus contained no reference to the facts whidl petitioller
claims establish that the petition was filed in time. The board
demurred to the petition on the grounds, among others, that
the court "hal'! no jurisdiction of the subject of the purported
eause of action set forth or referred to in said petition," that
the petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, and that the petition was not filed "within
the time permitted by law, and, more specifically," within
30 days after the effective date of the board's decision. With
the demurrer the board filed its an,swer expressly admitting
"the allegations contained in Paragraphs T, HI, IV, V and
VI" of the petition am] Ilt""~'illl! 1I11 oUlI'r ant"~lItioll!; thf'rt'of.
'rhE'rE'after pE'titionpr, with )('IlW of I'!lllrt. filE'd an nnwrHlmE'llt
to paragraphs VI and Vll of his pl·tition. As amended, para-
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graph VJ <Il1<'grs, nnlong other things, that the boaru's decision "was Il1Iul\, cfft'elive illlllw\lialdy upon delivery of a copy
thereof to IH'1itionrr, and 1hat ~aid copy was reeeiwd by petitioner on A IIgust ] 9, Hl41i; 111111 011 said A ugllst 19, 1!14(), petitioner reqlll'slNl l'rspoIJdl'111 f-;hltp Board of Medi('al Examiners, by reqll(>slin~ its dul.'" lIPI)()i1l1eLl shorthand reporter,
Ralph A, Sollar", to p)'ppar(' H fllll anll complete record of the
proceedings held .. ,; 1hat OJ} September 24, 1946, petitioner's
attorney ... received direct from said Ralph A. Sollars, via
Railway Express, the record hereinbefore referred to and now
on file with the above entitled court."
[2] The board filed no answer to the amendment to the
petition. Nevertheless, it now asserts that "none of petitioner's allegations upon this subject [request for the record of
the board's proceedings], denied in the return, were proved.
In fact, there was no attempt to prove them." Apparently
the board is suggesting that the denials contained in its
answer to the petition as originally filed should be deemed
extended to relate also to new matter added by the amendment
but that its express admission of the allegations of paragraph
VI does not relate to that paragraph as amended. There is no
merit in such suggestion. If the denials of the answer be
deemed extended (and we are aware of no authority to support such an extension, in the absence, as here, of stipulation
to that effect) to new matter pleaded in the amendment to
the petition, then the board is in the position of denying not
only that petitioner requested a copy of the board proceedings,
but of denying also that a copy of its decision was ever delivered to or received by petitioner so as to set running the time
allowed to petitioner to file this mandamus proceeding. "Every
material allegation of the complaint, not controverted by the
answp,r, must, for the purposes of the action, be taken as true .
. . . " (Code Civ. Proc., § 462.) We are of the view that the
board, by failing to deny the new factual matter contained
ill the amendment to the petition, must be deemed to have
admitted it. (See 21 Cal.Jur. § 106, p. 155, and § 131, p. 188.)
[lb] The board urges that in any case a request made of the
shorthand reporter to prepare the record of the proceedings
before the board is not a request of "the agency" within the
provision of -Section 11523 and did not. operate to extend the
time withiu which petitionpr might file his mandamus petition.
In support of its position the board points to section 1300 of
title 16 of the California Administrative Code. by which it has
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established the locations of its offices in Sacramcnto, Los Angeles, and San Francisco (see also Bus. & Prof. Codt', § 2109) ;
and to section 1303 of the same code, by which it delegates
(pursuant to the autbority of Gov. Code, § 11500) certain of
its functions to its secretary-treasurer, "or in his absence from
the office of the Board. to its Assistant Secretary." The board
argues that its failure in this latter section to expressly delegate the function of receiving a request for a record of disciplinary proceedings before it, establishes that petitioner's
request to the shorthand reporter amounted to no request at
all, within the intendment of section 11523 of the Government
Code. But the very language used in the last mentioned section
carries an implication that it must be liberally, rather than
narrowly, construed. The language is that "The complete
record of the proceedings, or such parts thereof' as are designated by the petitioner, shall be prepared by the agency," etc.
It seems obvious that such part of the proceedings as is reflected only by the reporter's notes can "be prepared by the
agency" only as it acts through the reporter. In other words,
the reporter is neces..c;arily representative of the agency in
preparation of at least a part of the record. There is no denial
that in this case Sollars was the agency's "duly appointed
shorthand reporter" nor is there any contention that any
person other than the official reporter could have prepared
the record. Furthermore, section 11500 of the Administrative
Code does expressly provide that "wherever the word 'agency'
alone is used tke power to act may be delegated by the agency
and wherever the words 'agency itself' are used the power to
act shall not be delegated unless the statutes relating to the
particular agency authorize the delegation of the agency'.
power to hear and decide." (Italics added.) We are of the
view that if sllch quoted section has any significance at all
in relation to the proposition for which the board invokes it
that it tends to support petitioner's position rather than that
of the board. Certainly the function of making the record
in the first place; i. e., of taking the notes in shorthand, was
delegated to the official reporter; yet section 1303 is as silent
on the delegation of that duty as it is on the function of preparing the transcript or receiving the request for the transcription.
The" Certificate of Reporter" attached to the record states
tllat "the foregoing is a full, true and correct transcript
of the short}land not~s taken by m~ ill the above entitled matter, 011 th(' dates b('rt'inhf"fo)'t' !;pecified, and . . . is a full,
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true and rOJ"r('ct statement of the procpedings had in the
same lllall!'r as dirp\'l ed by tile Bua ru of Medical Examiners."
In it!:; answer to the pctitiun for lllillHlall1l1s the board alleges
that the rt'curd as filed in the trial court is accurate, and
adopts into its answer by reference, all of the contents of such
record. It also relies upon the same record to support its
arguments on other phases of this case, hereinafter discussed.
It is to be noted that such record contains not only the oral
proceedings before the board, including photostatic copies of
exhibits introduced, but also copies of the written accusation
before the board, of Notices of Hearing, of petitioner's Notice
of Defense, and of petitions and notices concerning the taking of depositions; in other words, the entire file of the board
proceedings is seemingly included. Thus, the authenticity of
the record is established; the attack is directed not at the
authority of the reporter to have prepared the record for the
agency but only at his authority to have received the request
for the same on behalf of the agency. Under such circum·
stances, the holding of the trial court to the effect that petitioner's request to the reporter constituted substantial compliance
with the statutory provisions and amounted to a request
to the agency and that the act of the "duIy appointed
reporter" in furnishing the transcript was the act of the
agency, must be sustained.
2. The EWlence Before the Board
Petitioner urges and the trial court found that certain of
the findings of the board, upon which its decision rested, were
not supported by the weight of the evidence received by the
board, and, therefore, abuse of the board's discretion was
establi!>hed within the provisions of section 1094.5 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. That section, enacted in 1945, treats
of court review of administrative orders and decisions. It
provides, among other things, that" (a) Where [as here]
the writ [of mandamus] is issued for the purpose of inquiring
into the validity of any final administrative order or decision
made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing
is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and
discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior
tribunal, cotporation, board or officer, the case shall be heard
by the court sitting without a jury. All or part of the record
of the proceedings before the . . . board . . . may be filed.
• . . If the expense of preparing alI or any part of the record

308

)

MORAN .,. BOARD OF' ~fI.~DJCAL EXAloUNEBS

[32

V.~d

bas been borne by tb(' pl'evailillg part.,}', Klich eXpl'nF;e shall hi'
taxable as costs.
.. (b) The inquiry in such a cas(' shall extend to the questions whether . . . there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if . . . the findings
are not supported by the evidence.
(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in \vhich the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines
that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence."
[3] That the trial court in this case was "authorized by
law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence" is
well established. (See Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners
(1943), 21 Cal.2d 790, 795 [136 P.2d 304] ; 8ipper v. Urban
(1943),22 Cal.2d 138, 141 [137 P.2d 425] ; Hohreiter v. Garrison (1947), 81 Cal.App.2d 384, 402 [184 P_2d323].} As
stated in the ]ast cited case, at page 402, "Thus, the ultimate
power of decision rests with the trial court. " And, as declared
in Estate of Bristol (1943),23 Cal.2d 221, 223 (143 P.2d 689],
on appeal from the judgment of the trial court, j, The rule as to
our province is: 'In reviewing the evidence . . • all conflicts
must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate
and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict
if possible. It is an elementary ... principle of law, that
when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power
of the appellate court begins and ends with a determinati011
as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached
by the jury. When two or more inferences can be reasonably
deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power
to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.' (Italics
added.) (Orawford v. Southern Pacific 00. (1935), 3 Cal.2d
427,429 [45 P.2d 183].) The rule quoted is as applicable in
reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when considering a
jury's verdict. . . . Appellate courts, therefore, if there be
any reas~lnable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor of the
finding." (See also Estate of Teel (1944),25 Ca1.2d 520, 526
[154 P.2d 384]; Viner v. Untrecht (1945),26 Ca1.2d 261,267
[158 P.2d 3]; Rice v. Oalifornia Lutheran lIospital (1945),
27 Cal.2d 296, 301 [163P.2d 8601 ;De Young v. De Young
,j

/

)
J

.1 uly 1948 J

MORAN

v.

BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

309

[32 C.2d 301; 196 P.2d 20)

(1946),27 Ca1.2d 521,526 [165 P.2d 457).) It follows that the
question before us is whether the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to petitioner, sustains the findings of the trial
court to the effect that the charges against petitioner were not
supported by the weil.!;ht of the evidence.
[4] As indicated hereinabove, the only evidence considered by the court wa.-; the record of the proceedings before the
board, which inclu<leu a transcript of the oral hearing. The accusation filed with the board charged that petitioner on certain
dates in 1945 violated section 2301 of the Business and Professions Code in that at the respectively specified times, and
otberwi!'e than in "emergency treatment . . . or required by
the presence of incurable disease ... or the infirmities attendant on age, t t he prescribed narcotics for three alleged
drng addicts, whom we designate llere as Catherine (drugs
prl'scribed betwecn October 15 and December 11, 1945) ; Allan
(drugs prescribed between October 22 and November 23,
1945); and R. L. (drugs prescribed on September 28 and
on Nowmber 10, 1945). Petitioner freely admits that he did
prescribe certain derivatives of opium to the persons named,
but he contends, and the court found, that the weight of tl)('
evidence shows that petitioner's treatment of each patient was
"emergency treatment . . . and that their conJition at all
times was complicated by the presence of an incura.ble disease," and that consequently the treatlnent was lawful and
both legally and medically proper. Such contention of the
petitioner and the findinl!: and conclusion of the court in his
favor are abundantly supported by the evidence.
Section 2391 of the Business and Professions Code provides
that "the prescribing, . . . furnishing, ... or administering • • • any of the drugs or compounds mentioned in section 2390 [which includes opium and morphine] to a habitue
or addict eonstltutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this ehpter [the chapter on medicine].
"If the drugs • . . are administered • . . by a licensed
physician aDd surgeon of this State . • . this section shall not
apply to 8DJ' of the following cases :
"(a) EDoergency treatment of a patient whose addiction
is complicated by the presence of incurable discase. . . .
" (b) Trptment of habitues or addicts ill institutions approved by tJhe board [of Medical Examiners]. . . ."
.And in eection 11391 of the Health and Safety Code it is
provided daat: "No person sha.ll treat an addict for addiction

)
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except in one of the following: (a) An institution approved by
the Board . . . [Four other types of institutions are here
listed]. This section does not apply during emergency treatment or where the patient's addiction is complicated by the
presence of incurable disease. . . . t t
Petitioner testified that he is a graduate of Tulane University Medical School, served an interneship, and thereafter served as a medical officer in the United States Navy
during World War II; that he had engaged in private practice from September, 1944, to October, 1945 j that the alleged
addict Catherine first came to his office, at Carmel, on October
13, 1945; that she was "complaining of severe pain in the
left side of her face, and headache, and abdominal pain, and
she told me that she had previously had trifacial neuralgia,
which had been successfully injected, so I attempted to do the
same thing over but the first time it did not work very well,
80 then I gave her some narcotics to take care of the pain";
that he continued treating her until December, 1945, and
"prescribed a considerable amount of narcotic" because "it
was evidently needed to control her pain"; that after he
secured her history he was "treating her for an incurable
disease, to-wit, tic douloureux and the trifacial neuralgias. . . .
This trifacial, after it exists for some time, is quite difficult
to control"; that he wrote to doctors who had previously
treated the patient; that one of such doctors replied, under
the date of October 24, 1945, that in 1928 he "did a left infra
orbital injection for tic in 1928, which she [the patient] says
was successful for six years. She now asks that I give you this
information in the hope you will make another injection for
her. She was then and is still, as far as I know, an addict."
Petitioner further testified that he thereupon attempted (during the latter part of October, 1945) to secure admission to
Las Encinas Hospital (which is approved by the board for the
treatment of narcotic addiction) for the patient; that Dr.
C. W. Thompson, medical director of the hospital, stated that
no vacancies were then available, but upon inquiry from
petitioner, replied that he (Dr. Thompson) thought that petitioner "would be allowed to give narcotics to this patient . . .
as a humanitarian measure pending the time when the patient
could be admitted for treatment"; that early in November he
again "made a strenuous effort" to have the patient admitted
to the same hospital but was again told that no vacancies "
existed; that he thereupon attempted to secure admission for

)
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the patient into a differenl private IHlspital, also approved by
the board for narcotic tr('atml~nt, and also into the County
Hospital; that when he filially .. ~nt everything completed she
refused to enter the hospital' '; that the only money the patient
ever paid him was for "her telephonE' calls" ;·'that he had a
well established practice with a rcasonable income at the time
the patient consulted him. Petitioner stated further that on
Catherine's first visit to his office he injected her face with
novocaine and alcohol, and also prescribed morphine sulphate
because sometimes such injections do not "stop the pain";
that he had had no previous "experience with narcotics [addicts]" during his private practice; that on the occasion of
Catherine'8 first visit to his offiee he did not know or suspect
that she was an addict; that on examining her he observed a
"muscular tic" or a "tic douloureux" on the "whole left
side of her face" with frequent spasms; that such a tic is associated with a trifacial neuralgia; that his office hist.ory of the
patient had been inadvertently destroyed by an inexperienced
office assistant. Also introduced into evidence was a letter received by petitioner from the patient during the period he was
attempting to secure her admission to Las Encinas, in which
she described her years of suffering, including a history of
pain from "gall bladder, tri facial, and arthritis" and expressed her appreciation for petitioner's kindness in attempting to help her. Much of petitioner's testimony as to Catherine's condition and her statements and appearance of being
in great pain, as to petitioner's efforts to secure her admission
to a hospital, and that petitioner was treating her primarily
for trifacial neuralgia, was confirmed by his mother, a registered nurse and experienced anesthetist who assisted petitioner
in his office. The mother testified further that Catherine
"haunted" petitioner's office seeking treatment; that he prescribed for her until he "could get her into an institution";
that the patient said "she couldn't get the money" for hospitalization, and when petitioner" came to the conclusion that
she had tried long enough t.o get the money he told her he
couldn't treat her any longer, that she would have to go to an
institution, and if she couldn't get the money for a private
institution ... she would have to go to the county, and I
called the COlll!ty Hospital and asked them to receive her and
they said they- would." Prescription forms introduced into
evidence indicate that on 18 different dates between October
15 and December 11, 1945, petitioner prescribed morphine
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sulphate for Catherine; thereafter petitioner discontinued
treating the patient and on or about December 16, 1945, at
the direction of another doctor she was "moved to a sanitarium" for treatment for withdrawal of narcotics.
Other prescriptions show that on nine dates between October 22 and November 19, 1945, petitioner prescribed morphine
sulphate for the alleged addict, Allan. Petitioner testifil'd
that when he first examined Allan tile latter "was in an acute
asthmatic attack . . . choking . . . and I tried adrenalin and
that didn't work. Then I started giving him Vitamin C and
morphine and that seemed to hold him-eontrol his symptoms"; that the only way petitioner "could control his symptoms was by the administration of Morphine Sulphate in
large quantities"; that Allan was "to take these morphine
sulphate tablets whenever he had an attack"; that Allan's
history indicated "that he had had his asthmatic attacks for
several years. . . . He told me he had an attack every twelve
or twenty-four hours"; that" asthmatics normally have that
terrific choking condition" and recurrence "so regularly" is
"quite ordinary ... depends entirely on changes of the
weather and diet." Petitioner's mother confirmed that Allan
first came in the office with an attacl. of asthma, "Practically
choking and couldn't get his breath. . . . Every occasion he
came in the office he was choking... This was no simulation."
Dr. Harold E. Fraser, "Medical Examiner of the Courts of
San Francisco," testified that he examined Allan in January,
1946; Allan told him of suffering so severely from chronic
asthma that morphine treatment had been given; that he, the
witness, believed Allan had asthma; that emergency treatment
might require morphine; that morphine SUlphate is recognized by some physicians as a proper prescription for chronic
asthma.
Prescriptions indicate that on September 28, 1945, and again
on November 10, 1945, petitioner prescribed pantopon, another opium derivative, for the alleged addict, R. L. Petitioner
testified that he saw R. L. "about twice, maybe three times";
that petitioner administered narcotics "because of extreme
pain and suffering in connection with a spinal arthritis" with
which the patient was afflicted; that he (petitioner) did not
consider R. L. an addict at the time but was "suspicious of·
him" and therefore inquired of the State Division of Narcotic
Enforcement concerning the patient. Petitioner stated further
that he believed he was treating all three of the alleged addicts
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.. for a pnfhology rathcr thaD addiction." An inspector from
th(' Division of Narcotic Enforcement confirn1l'd the fact that
petitiont·r hall itllluir('d concerning R. L., on September 18,
194:;, Hlltl had be('ninformed the foUowiug day that "there
was nothinl,! on file at the offie(' of thl' Divisioll" concerning
the patiellt. 'fhl' iuspedor testified furtll('r that 011 November 13, 1945, petitioner hael made n writtl'!1 report to the division concerning his prescription of narcotics for Allan in
which petitioner stateu Al1an to be an addict, anu on the
same date made a similar report concerning Catherine; that
from the reports "there was no indication that there was any
dereliction on" petitioner's part; that in all his" dealings and
conversations with" petitioner tht' inspector found petitioner
"most cooperative."
The agent of the board, who filed the accusation against
petitioner, also testified that when he questioned petitioner
concerning the three alleged addicts petitioner "made a full
and complete disclosure" and "did not appear to try to hold
anything back. "
It is apparent that the evidence summarized above amply
supports thc trial court's finding that petitioner's treatment
of the thret' alleged addicts "was emergency treatment . . •
and that tht'ir condition at all times was complicated by the
presence of an incurable disease." Petiiioncr testified that in
each case his treatment was for the purpose of relieving acute
pain arid suffering. [5] From the long history of Catherine's aftlictions and the opinion of petitioner the court was
warranted in the view that her condition was "complicated
by the presence of an incurable disease," and it is common
knowledge that some sufferers from severe cases of asthma and
arthritis, the diseases of Allan and R. L., spend many years
vainly seeking permanent relief and cure. The board points
to evidence in the record which it urges establishes that petitioner was treating none of the three patients as an emergency
measure or for a bona fide disease but solely for addiction.
Such evidence at the most presents only a conflict with that
discUssed hereinabove. The trial court has resolved the con1lict in petitioner's favor and under the rules already set forth
its decision must stand.
[6] As DlIlntioned hereinabove, both the board and its individual members are JlIlDied as respondents in the petition for
mandamus, and the judgment rt'lldered by the trial court is
also directed to the board amI to the persons of whom it is
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com posed, who arc first named and thcl1 described as "'Members of the Stalc D(':lnl of Medical ExulIlincrs." The board
contends Owt t he members were improperly joiucd as parties
respOnd('llt in that the board itself is tIle "only agency whieh
may afford any relief or take any action in the matter." The
board urges also that its membership changes from time to
time and that undue labor and confusion will result if s1IbstitutiolJ of parties must occaRionally be made in a court aet ion
involving the board. In support of its position on this point
the board cites Boland v. Cecil (1944),65 Cal.App.2d Supp.
832,840 [150 P.2d 8]9] ; Reed v. Molony (1940),38 Cal.App.
2d 405, 411 [101 P.2d 175] ; and Sparks v. Prior (1933), 131
Cal.App. i43, 744 [22 P.2d 233]. The first two of these cases
are concerned with determiuing whether certain named defendants were sued as individuals or in their respective official
capacities, and the statement in the third case, a proceeding to
review an order of the Board of Dental Examiners suspending
a dentist's license to practice, that only the board itself was
a proper party defendant, is not accompanied by a citation
of authority. It is our view that although the members of a
board such as the Board of Medical Examiners need not necessarily (in the absence of special facts requiring their presence) be included as partieR, it is not improper to name them in
their official capacity, as was done here. As stated at page 857
(§ 58) of 16 California Jurisprudence, "Where the duty
sought to be compelled is enjoined upon a board as such, the
proceeding should be against the board, although the better
practice seems to be to name the individual members in addition to the board. Moreover, there are exceptional cases in
which the disobedience of the board is due to the action of certain individual members, where such members must be expressly made defendants, the reason therefor, appearing in the
petition for the writ. Where the duty is enjoined upon particular officials as representatives of a body politic, the more general practice is to proceed against the officials, yet it is held
that there is no good reason why their principal, the legal
cntity which is commonly the real party to be affected by the
writ, may not be joined as a defendant in the proceeding;
though seldom a neces~ary party, it may not generally be calJed
an improper one." (See also Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist.
v. Felt (1931), 214 Cal. 308 [5 P.2d 585] ; City and County
of San Francisco v. Linat·('.~ (1!l40), 16 Ca1.2d 441. 448 fl06
P.2d 369] ; 35 Am.Jur. § 328, p. 80.) We hold that ill the ab-
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lienee of Jegh,]ative provision to tI)(' clllltl'ar~' lhe 1IH'lIlbC'rs of
the board aT!' prllper, bllt 1101. lIC'(~e!isar.y. paI'lil'!; 111 this proceeding.
[7] The board 'smotion to tax costs awarded to petitioner
by the trial court was heard by a judg(> othE'r than the one
who reudered judgment ill petitioner's favor; an order W8!1
entered taxing petitioner's costs at ouly $31.60 and disallow·
ing the sum of $l1i paid by petitioner to the reporter as the
cost of the transcript of the proceedings before the board: and
as stated bel'einabove, petitioner has appealed from the order.
As already quoted herein, section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that in such 8 proceeding as this, "If the
expense of preparing all or any part of the record has bE'en
borne by the prevailing party, such expense shall be taxable
as costs."
Petitioner is the prevailing party; as appears hereinabove
the record filed by him of the board proceedings is an authentic record, adopted by the board as a part of its return to the
alternative writ; it is not disputed that petitioner bore the
cost of preparing all of such record or that the amount paid
is reasonable; it follows that his expense is taxable as costs
and that the order taxing costs must be modified by adding
the sum of $117.
In case No. L. A. 20514 the judgment from which the
board appeals is affirmed. In case No. L. A. 20515 the order
taxing petitioner's costs at $31.60 is modified by adding to
such costs the sum of $117 and as so modified is aftirlned.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.

/

TRAYNOR,J., Dissenting. -The procedure governing
judicial review of the adjudicatory decisions of statewide administrative agencies is prescribed by section 1094.5 of tile
Code of Civil Procedure, which follows "the procedural pattern laid down by recent court decisions. " l (Tenth Biennial
Report of the Judicial Council of California, 26.) This section
provides:
.
H (b)
The inquiry in such a ease shall extend to the question whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of jl1ri:i)ietioll; whether there was a fair trial; and
lDare y, Board of ,uNlit-n1 E.rlilllitll'I'II, 2] Cnl.2d 790 [136 P.2d 304];
BIU.¥c'l1 v. II ilIer~ 21 CaJ.:!u S17 l1ati 1>.2d 318); 8ipper v. Urban. :!:!
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whether tilere was allj' prejudi,!ial ahtli'>p of diserctioll. Abus\'
of discretion is established if tlll' responuellt has not proceeded
in the manner reqnireu hy law. till' order or decision is not
supported by the findings. or the fiudings are not supported
by the evidence .
.. (c) Where it is claimed tllat the findings are not sup·
ported by the evidenl'e, in cases in "'hich the court is author·
ized by law to exercise its independent juugment on the evi·
oence, abuse of discretion is l'stablished if the court determines
that the findings are not supported by the weight of the
('vidence; and in all other cases abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole
record. "
Thus, the purpose of review under this section is the correction of abuse of discretion. "Where the fact finding power
is involved, the review by mandate will correct an •abuse of
discretion on the facts.' " (Tenth Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California, 141.) When the action of a local
administrative agency is challenged, an abuse of discretion on
the facts is established if the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. In the case of a statewide agency, with
statutory powers only, the court may exercise an independent
judgment on the facts, and 8n abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. Thus, the controlling
issue in a mandamus proceeding to review the action of a statewide agency exercising statutory powers only, when it is
claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, is
whether the findings are supported by the we1:ght of the evidence. In some instances not yet clearly defined (Dare v. Board
of Medical Examiners, supra, 21 Ca1.2d 790, 799; Russell v.
Miller, 21 Ca1.2d 817 [136 P.2d 318] ; Wyatt v. Cerl, 64 Cal.
App.2d 732 [149 P.2d 309] ; Madruga v. Borden Co., 63 Cal.
App.2d 116 [146 P.2d 273]; West Coast Etc. Co. v. Contractors Etc. Board, 68 Cal.App.2d 1 [155 P.2d 863]; McDonough v. Garrison, GS Cal.App.2d 318 [156 P.2d 983];
West Coast Etc. Co. v. Contractors Etc. Board, 72 Cal.App.2d
287 []64 P.2d 811]) the court may accept evidence in addition to that presented before the agenc;t. If it does, however,
tIlt' basic issue in the case is still whether the weight of the
evidt'llce supports the agency's findings. Under section 1094.5
of the Code of Civil Procedure the superior court must find

/
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that the weight of the evidence does or doe!:; not slIpport the
agt'ney's findings. The question before the 'superior (!Ollrt iii.
not what finding~ it would have made had it been the administrative agency and the hearing had been held before it, bllt
\vhether the agency abused its discretion by making findings
that are not supported by the weight of the evidence, When
an appellate court reviews the decision of the superior court
it must determine whether the superior court correctly decided the issue before it, namely, whether the agency's findings are supported by the weight of the evidence. It cannot
properly make that determination without reviewing the entire record to see where the weight of the evidence lies. If it
considered the evidence only in part,it would not be determining where the weight of the evidence lies but only whether
there is or is not some evidence on either side.
The majority opinion, however, is based on the assumption
that the superior court is not acting as a reviewing court but
a.c; a trial court deciding issues of fact in the first instance as
if there had never been an administrative hearing and as if
thl' record made before the agency had been made before the
court. Even though an appellate court reviewing the identical
record of the administrative hearing that was before the superior court for review, concludes that the weight of the evidence clearly supports or does not support the agency's findings, as the case may be, it is bound by the superior court'.
dl'cision as if the case were originally tried there, if there is
conflicting evidence in the record. What special insight or
qualifications does that court have to make its review of the
identical record binding on the appellate court! Thus, the
weight of the evidence test governs the superior court in reviewing the administrative record but not the appellate court
in reviewing the decision of the superior court. The appellate
eonrt must blind itself to the fact that the proceeding before
the superior court was a review of the administrative record
and treat that proceeding as a trial de novo. Although the
Rl1perior court must find that the agency's findings were or
were not supported by the weight of the evidence. the appellate court is concerned, not with whether the superior court
correctly decided that iSRue, but whether there is evidence to
Rllpport the findings of the superior court, disregarding complPtely an;. qU(lstion as t.o t.he weight of the evidence. The
basic issue in the ca!l£', whether the agency's findings are supported by the weight of the evidence, is transformed into a

;'
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new issue essentially analogous to the issue in the case of 8
nonsuit or directed verdict. The appellate court mnst consider
only the evidence in favor of the agency's findings, when the
superior court finds that they are supported by the weight
of the evidence, or only the evidence against such findings,
when the superior court finds that they are not supported by
the weight of the evidence.
The majority opinion by treating the proceeding before
the superior court, not as a review, but as a trial de novo,
reverts, so far as appellate review is concerned, to the doctrine
of Laisne v. State Board of Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d 831 [123
P.2d 457], from which this court withdrew in Dare v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal.2d 790 [136 P.2d 304] and
Sipper v. Urban, 22 Cal.2d 138 [137 P.2d 425], and virtually
makes the superior court the final reviewing court of the d(>ci·
sions of statewide administrative agencies exercising only
statutory powers, when an abuse of discretion on the facts is
claimed.
In Sipper v. Urban, supra, 22 Cal.2d 138, 144, Mr. Justice
Schauer, who cast the controlling vote, declared:
"The complete trial de fI,(}vO doctrine of the Laisne case has
been abandoned. By the decision in the Dare case (Dare v.
Board of Medical Examiners, supra) the majority of the court
has receded from the extreme position taken in the Laisne case
with respect to the right of a party to a complete trial de novo
on mandamus review, and has thereby substantially rectified
perhaps the most serious of the practical difficulties suggested
in the dissenting opinion in the Laisne case as bound to be encountered in practice under the majority rule as then stated.
The procedure as now declared gives the reviewing- court the
power and duty of exercising an independent judgment as to
both facts and law, but contemplates that the record of the
administrative board shall come before the court endowed
with a strong presumption in favor of its regularity and propriety in every respect and that the burden shall rest upon
the petitioner to support his challenge affirmatively, com·
petently and convincingly. In other words, rarely, if ever,
will a board determination be disturbed unless the petitioner
is able to show a jurisdictional excess, a serious error of law,
or an abuse of discretion on the facts. This is in full accord
with the presumption declared in subdivision 15 of section
1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 'That official duty bas
been regularly performed.' It is, of course, also inherent in
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the rnalll}UIIJUS rem('(ly 1I1al Ihp rig-hI or IIi(' prlitiollC'r to the
initial issllllnc'c or thp writ i:-; lIot I1h.-;ollll ... lIis right t.o make
the applicatioll is absolulr but the uJlJllil·.alioli illiplieitly ralls
for the exercise of judicial disc:rction, awl within the limits of
that discretion (for definition of judicial discretion, see Gossman v. Gossman, 52 Cal.App.2d 184, 194-195 [126 P.2d 178))
the writ may be granted or withheld. as the facts averred in
and circumstances appertaining to each particular case may
require, in the interests of sound justice."
It'is now apparent that the rules that the "record of the
administrative board shall come before the court endowed
with a strong presumption in favor of its regularity and
propriety in every respect" and that "the burden shall rest
upon the petitioner to support his challenge affirmatively, competently and convincingly" have only such force as the superior court wishes to give them. Appellate courts abandon all
responsibility for their enforcement.
The condition in this state of judicial review of the adjudicatory decisions of statewide adminifitrative agencies exercising only statutory powers may be briefly described. Appellate courts disclaim virtually all responsibility when it is
claimed that the agency's findings are not supported b~' the
evidence. The superior court determines ,,;hether or not the
writ shall issue, whether or not additional evidence shall be
taken or a complete trial de novo given, and whether or not
the agency decision shall be upheld or set aside. Whatever the
superior court does must be upheld by the appellate courts if,
viewing the proceeding not as a judicial review but as a proceeding like a nonsuit or directed verdict, there is some evidence or inferences therefrom in favor of the superior court's
decision. Thus, on the one hand the superior court by refusing to issue the writ or by upholding the agency's findings,
even though they are not supported by the weight of the evidence, may refuse to exercise the check on administrative
agencies that the statute contemplates they should exercise.
On the other hand, it has virtually unlimited freedom to
destroy the effectiveness of such an agency, When it erroneously finds that the weight of the evidence does not support the agency's findings it substitutes its judgment for
that of the. agency and controls the discretion vested by the
Legislature- in the agency. (See, Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal.
483 [105 P. 582] ; Doble Rtr(1Jn 'Af(}tor.~ Corp, v. Daugherty,
195 Cal. 158 [232 P. 140] ; Bila v. Young, 20 Cal.2d 865 [129
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1'.211 a(ilJ; AJlJsrs;o]t v. /'QJ·kr.r, ·H ('aI.App.2(1 floB [112 P.!M
70;)].) .Jndicial r('\'i('w bpf'UIOC!l' mm'(' thall It ch('cl, on adminis·
trativc action, it COlli Jlletely RII pplant..,; t bat net ion and dcstroys
"the vaJues-expertlle8s,specia1i7.ation and the like-which,
as we have seen, were sought in the establishment of administrative agencies." (R~port U. S. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 77.)
It is my opinion that the superior court in this case has
erroneously found that the weight of the evidence does not
support the board '8 findings.
Section 2391 ofthe Business and Professions Code provides:
"Unless otherwise provided by this section, the prescribing,
selling, furnishing, giving away or administering or offering to
prescribe, sell, furnish, give away or administer any of the
drugs or compounds mentioned in section 2390 to a habitue or
addict constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning
of this chapter.
"If the drugs or compounds are administered or applied
by a licensed physician and surgeon of this State or by a
registered nurse acting under his instructions and supervision, this section shall not apply to any of the following cases :
"<a) Emergency treatment of a patient whose addiction is
complicated by the presence of incurable disease, serious accident or injury, or the infirmities attendant upon age.
" (b) Treatment of habitues or addicts in institutions approved by the board where the patient is kept under restraint
and control, or in eity or county, jails or State prisons."
In an interview with Joseph W. Williams, a special agent
of the board, on April 16, 1946, petitioner stated: "Katherine
S . . . came to me about the middle of October, 1945 and
she wanted narcotics. She said she had a trifacial neuritis.
I prescribed morphine in % grain tablets, 20 tablets at a time.
She claimed she had been treated for the trifacial condition
in Ohio. I wrote her doctor in Ohio a letter. She claimed to
have considerable pain in the face and needed a half grain
every four hours.
,. I prescribed for her for about a week before I wrote her
doctor for a history of her case. I knew she was a narcotic .
addict and tried to talk her into going and taking the cure.
I examined the cranial nerves, but did not make . any x-rays.
"I gave her two injections of alcohol for her trifacial condition. One was given about a week after I began preseribing
nareotics for her. The second was given some time in Novem-
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every three or fOllt days. I bavt: 00 (~lIS(' hi!!tory of ber ID
the office J think I madt' one. but I thinl, myattornpy bas it.
She was going to sue me and I !It'llt her 61e to 1Il~' attorney. I
don 'trecall whether I took a case history on her or not. but
tbeonly examination I made was the ont' of the cranial nerves
of tht' face.
HI finally talked ber into Iloing to take a cure for narcotic
addiction and contacted Doctor Thompson of Las Encinas
Sanitarium at Pasadena and made arrilogt>ments for ht'r to
go there and take the cure for addiction. but she never went.
IJate in Decenlbet. J945, she went to Alexander's Sanitarium.
Belmont.
.. I prescribed narcotics for ber from about the 19th of Octobet up to about t.he time she w('nt to Alexander's Sanitarium,
1 .knew she was all addict but she c1aiml'd to have pain in ber
fa(~t' and I mort' or leSR took her word for ber pain. as I did
not makt' very much of an examination .
.. She gave thE' name of this Doctor in Ohio who was supposed to hne treated bE'r. I wrote to him but don't recall
receiving any reply.
"I also preseribt'd Darcotics for Allan G . . . from about
tht' middle of October to the end of DE'cember. 1945. J ba\'e
no ehaM for G .' as I did not Illake 8 chart for bim. Be
bad asthma and I prescribf>d a tub(· of lJ.1 ~rain morphine at
a time for bim. His prescription!! wt'r(' every three or four
days apart also. Wh('n he fiNlt came to me bt' told tnt' bow
much morphint' h(' was using. and I thought it. was a sufficjent
quantity to make him an Addict. He !ltate€! be had been using
this for a long time .
.. At that timt' he was a eook on a ranch in CarmeJ Vaney.
I knpw he was an addict and tried to get bim to take the cure
but ht' wonldn'1 do al1~'thinJ? to h('lp bim!lielf. Ht' didn't want
t.o take it. Althongh h(> had al1 IlRthmati(' conrlition be did not
need that much morphint' for hill a!lithma. The only reason
he had to have morphine WIlS b('elIllRf' he was an addict.
"I gav(' him sOInt> Vm C for a~thma, in addition to the
str~ight morp~in(' I pl'('!«'rih<>rl for him. 1 did Dot make a chart
or keep a hisfor~' on hill cast'.
uH .... "'as a eouk at P<>hhl" Rp81'h School. I prf>lIl'riht>d
nareotil's for him also for st'\'('ral months. He was 8uppol>t'd
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t.o havc dUoul'l1al ulcer:" uut J did not wake any x-rays of
him. I did a gastric 3naly"j" aud dccirlcd he was a narcotic

addict.
"1 prescribed a tube of pantopoll, lJa grain, at a time for
him. I don't know how many pn'8eriptions 1 wrote for him.
I did not keep a record or history of his cas!', either. I was
sure he was all addict when he first came to lllt', but I wrote
prescriptions for him for narcotics.
.. I also wrote prescriptions for Mrs. F. O. P . . . . She
claimed to have spillal arthritis. The next time she came in
with gall stone::;. 1 prescribed 20 dilaudid, 1/16 grain. I never
made any x-rays or kept any case history on her. She is supposed to be an addict. "
The foregoing testimony was corroborated by another agent
who was present at the interview.
'I'he complete cross-examination of Mr. Williams follows:
"Q. Mr. Williams, the Doctor made a full and complete
disclosure to you when you questioned him, did he not'
A. I believe he did.
I I Q.
And he did not try to hold anything back' A. He did
not appear to.
"Q. And when you speak of Mrs. Moran, that is the Doctor's mother, seated here in the room' A. Yes, the lady in
black (indicating).
"Q. And at the time you made your notes, did you immediately reduce the conversation to writing or was there some
lapse there f A. I wrote the original notes while sitting there
at his desk.
'" Q. Did you receive on this case a report from the Bureau
of Narcotic Enforcement Y A. Did I receive'
"Q. Yes. A. No, I did not.
"MR. ANDERSON: That is all.
"MR. HUTOHINSON: That is all. Thank you. Any question
by any Board Member? (No response.)
(Witness excused.) "
The record reveals the following chronology of petitioner '.
treatment and prescriptions for these addicts :

/

)

Katherine'. Case
October 13,
amination
October 15,
October 22,

1945-Petitioner's first meeting with addict. Exand injection of novocaine and alcohol.
1945-Prcscriptioll, morphine sulphate, 20 doses.
1945-Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20 do.'it's.
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]\lIthcr-illl' rl'qllcsted that the drug be tak':l1 by "h~'pu"
b('(';lww 1hl:' t astl:' of morphine was objectionable to her.

23, 194;)--Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20 dosCH.
26, 1!l4a-Petitioller received a letter dated October
24, 1945, reading as follows: "I hnve just recciv<.:d a lette)'
from.1\ patient of yours, Mrs. K. . . S. . ., formerly of
Cincinnati, for whom I did a left infra obital injection for
tic in 1928, which she says was successful for six years.
She now asks that I give you this information in the hope
you will makl' another injection for her. She was then and
is still, as fur as I know, all addict."
October 28, 1945-Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20 doses.
October 29, 1945-Prescriptioll, morphine sulphate, 20 doses.
Petitioner telephoned Las Encinas Sanitarium to have
Katherine admitted as a narcotic patient.
October 31, 1945-t>l'escription, morphine sulphate, 20 doses.
November 2, 1945 ~ Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses. Petitioner telephoned Las Encinas Sanitarium in a
second attempt to have Katherine admitted as a narcotic
patient.
November 10, 1945 - Petitioner sought to have Katherine
enter the Livermore Sanitarium for treatment as a narcotic
addict.
November 12, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses. Petitioner telephoned Las Encinas Sanitarium in
another further attempt to have Katherine admitted as a
llarcoticpatient. Katherine refused to enter County Hospital.
November 13, 1945-First and only report to Narcotic Division on furnishing drugs to addict.
November 14, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses.
November 16, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses.
November 19, 1945 - Prescription, morphine 8ulphate, 20

OctOUI'l'

Octobl~r

/

doses.
November 21,
40 doses.
November 23,
doses.
November 24,
Katherine.
November 26,
doses.

1945-Two prescriptions, morphine sulphate,
1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
1945-Petitioner's last pe1'sonal meeting with
1945'-:'" Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
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November 30, 1945 - Prescriptioll, morphine sulphate. 60
doses.
D~c~lIJber 5, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 60
doses.
December 11, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses.
44llall" Case
October 22, 1945-Prescription. morphine sulphate, 20 doses.
Ol·tober 81. 1945--Prescription. morphine sulphate, 20 doses.
November 4, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses.
November 10, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate. 20
doses.
November 12, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses.
November 14, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses.
November 16, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses.
November 19, 1945 - Prescription, morphine sulphate, 20
doses.
November 23, 1945 - Prescription, morphine, 20 doses.
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B. L.', Case
September 28. 1945-Prcscription. pantapon, 20 doses.
November 10, 1945-Prescription. pantapon, 20 doses.
The burden was upon petitioner to prove that the treatments were emergency treatments of patients whose addiction
was complicated by the presence of incurable disease. (Code
Civ. Proe., § 1981; People v Moronati, 70 Cal.App. 17, 21
[232 P. 991] ; People v. Agnew, 16 Cal.2d 655, 663 [107 P.2d
601] ; People v. O.aki,209 Cal. 169, 191 [286 P. 1025J ; Bebbingt" v. California Western State, Life 1m. Co., 30 Cal.2d
157, 159 [180 P.2d 673); see 21 CaJ.Jur. 383, 384.}
During the hearing petitioner presented no expert testimony
or opinion that his furnishing the narcotics was necessary or
proper ulider the circumstances or in the light of the history
and qaminatioD of any of the addicts. Clearly the deposition
of Dr. Fraser and the letter from Dr. Thompson cannot serve
to show emergency treatment of addicts whose addiction is
complicated by the presence of incurable dis(·ase. Dr. Fraser,
.. Mc(lical EXllminer of the Courts of San }o'rancisco," testified
witb respect to Allan '. commitment proceeding for addiction.
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On rrtlss-('xsTtlillst ion br was asked by petit iOlll'r 's coumwl
.. Doctor, Iltorphiur sulphate is recognized b,Y SOIfl(' physH:lan~
as a propt'r prescription for a chronic asthmatic condition,
isn't that soY A. Ob, yes. it is used. ,. He did Dot testify,
howeyer. that it was necessary or proper in Allan's elise. When
asked on direct t'xaminatioD •• Ar£' YOll ahl(' to state. Doctor.
whl'tlirr it woul<l bavt' been necessary in hi!' trratmcnt to have
given him 20 one-half grains tabl(>t:,: for use during 8 week,
for any condition that he then had T" he rrplied, .. Well. that
might be a moot question-that is almost an expert question
to answer lhtl!. 1 think in tbe case of the treatment of asthma
we don't like to USe morphine in a cbronic condition of that
nature. However, I can see certain conditions where morphine
had been used where it would be objectionable." He was tht'n
asked the question, "Morphine would not have any curative
effect '-merely to alleviate the pain f" to which hc replied,
.. No, merely to alleviate his distress. "
Dr. Thompson, the medical director of Las Encinas Sanitarium was not available for cross-examination and his letter
was introduced by his counsel "in mitigation of punishment,
if allY" and it was received by the bearing officer" as bearsay,
as any other unsworn statement." The letter reads as follows:
•• To Whom it may concern:
.. This is to evidence and certify that Doctor James A.
Moran of Carmel, California, called by telephone during the
latter part of October. 1945, regarding one Mrs. S .... , stating that Mrs. S. . . was addicted to narcotics, and that be
would like very much to have her admitted to Las Encinas for
treatment .
.. At that time we had no vacancies and could not confirm
a reservation for this patient. Doctor Moran asked if I thought
he would be allowed to give narcotics to this patient until such
time as she could be admitted to Las Encinas for treatment,
and 1 replied that 1 thought this mtght be done as a humanitarian measure pending the time when the palScnt could be
admitted for treatment.
"Early in November, Doctor Moran phoned again, durin/!
my absence, and this time the conversation took place bctwet!lI
Doctor Stephen Smith, Medical Director and Doctor Moran.
Doctor )loran again stated the importance of treatment to
Doctor Smith and again he was told that no vacancies existed
and that we could do [lothin~ abollt thj> matter for the present..
Doctor Smltlt also recoglltzcd the lfnportance ~f Doctor Mur-
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4n's call and the 71rgency of .~/(p]J7?1ing treatment to the
patient, Mrs. S ..., but on account of lack of space, we were
unable to admit Mr-s. S. . . . for trcatment.
"Respectfully, C. W. Thompson, M.D., Medical Director."
(Italics added.)
There is nothing in this letter to indicate that Dr. Thonlpson
or Dr. Smith believed that the heavy doses ofDlorphine
prescribed for Katherine were required as emergency treatment of an addict whose addiction was complicated by an
incurable disease. The italicized statements in the letter, on
which petitioner particularly relies, express the belief that
pending Katherine's admission to the sanitarium for treatment lor addiction petitioner might prescribe narcotics as
a humanitarian measure. There was no approval, however,
of the amounts prescribed, and petitioner cannot reasonably
contend that he was treating her for addiction. The Health
and Safety Code provides: "A physician treating an addict
for addiction shall not prescribe for or furnish an addict
more than anyone of the following amounts of narcoticR
during each of the first fifteen days of such treatment: (a)
Eight grains of opium. (b) Four grains of morphine. "
( § 11392.) "After fifteen days of treatment the physician
shall not prescribe for or furnish to the addict more than
anyone of the following amounts of narcotics during each
day of such treatment: (a) Four grains of opium. (b) Two
grains of morphine." (§ 11393.) "At the end of thirty days
from the first treatment, the prescribing or furnishing of
narcotics shall be discontinued.' t (§ 11394.) Tbese restricted
amounts are in sharp contrast with the heavy doses petitioner
prescribed for Katherine. "The physician treating an addict
for addiction shall within five days after the first treatment
report by registered mail, over his signature, to the State
division, stating the name and address of the patient, and
the name and quantities of narcotics prescribed. Th, r,port
.1t4l1 dat, the progress of the patient under the treatment.
The physician shall in the same manner further report on
the fifteenth day of the treatment and on the thirtieth day
of the treatment, and thereafter shall make such further
reports as are requested in writing by the State division. t'
(§ 11395.) There was no compliance with this provision.
There remains petitioner's testimony that in each case his
treatment was for the purpose of relieving acute pain and
suffering and that he believed he was treating the addicts
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.. for a pathology rather than an addiction." The record
shows tbat the narcotics were furnishcJ by prescription,
apparently for use b~' t'ach addict in bis own way at his
own time. They were furnished over periods as long as 58
daYIi. None of the addicts was confined to bed. Each called
regularly at petitioner's office for his own form of narcotics.
There is no evidence of any physical examination of any
of them after their first appearance at petitioner's office. It
is not clear from the record to what extent, if any, petitioner
saw them thereafter before furnishing them with prescriptions. The chronology set forth above shows that four prescriptions for 160 doses of morphine were furnished Katherine
after petitioner last saw her on November 24, 1945. It is
difficult to believe that it is emergency treatment to prescribe
narcotics for an addict in such generous doses on 80 many
occasions without even seeing her. (See, People v. KimZey,
118 Cal.App.593, 595, 601 [5 P.2d 938].)
The record shows that Katherine did not suffer from anything but narcotic addiction. Doctor Moultain saw Katherine
at her sister's home on December 16, 1945, five days after
petitioner's last prescription. He found no objective symptom
of gall bladder ailment, of tic douloureux, or of other incurable disease, and concluded that her complaints "were purely
for the purpose of getting morphine." She confessed to him
that she was an addict and that "what she wanted was a dose
of morphine." He caused her to be moved to the Alexander
Sanitarium. Doctor Alden, the consulting psychiatrist at the
Alexander Sanitarium, after examining the findings and history made by other members of the medical staff and the
nurses' notes, and after conversing with Katherine, coneluded
that she was suttering from withdrawal of narcotics. He testified that there was no indication of any necessity for treatment for any other infirmity or disease. On Jailuary 12, 1946,
Katherine was released from the Alexander Sanitarium as
no longer requiring treatment.
In answering the contention that the board's findings should
be set aside because of petitioner's testimony that his prescriptions were given to alleviate the pain of his patients suttering
from incJlrable diseases, the District Court of Appeal, Second
District,~ Division Two, which reversed the judgment of the
superior court in this ease, in.an opinion by Presiding Justice
Moore succinctly stated:
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"But there was other proof upon that issue, to wit. the
circnml>1antial evidence from which incriminating inferences
may be drawn: (1) The excessively large number of doses
given to Sand G knowing that they were addicts Although
he knew that Mrs. S should be hospitalized for b('r addiction
and attempted to gain ber admittance into Las Encinas. b('
continned to prescribe the generous dosage to ber for six
weeks after that institution bad rejected her and notwith·
Iltanding her refusal to enter the eounty hospital. Such prescriptions were clear violations of section 11391. supra rHealth
& Saf. Code) from which an inference of guilt might be fairly
deduced and an adverse finding made under section 2391.
Business and Professions Code. (2) He prescribed 180 doses
for Mr. G for his asthma knowing that G was an addict and
that morphine had no curative qualities. (See § 11393. supra.)
He told 8 special agent that the only reason G had to bave
morphine was his addiction; that he 'did not know how Dlany
prescriptions' be wrote for him. Nor did he keep a record or
history of his ease. 'I was sure he was an addict when he first
came to me, but I wrote prescriptions for him for narcotics.'
After having already prescribed 100 doses for G. on November
13 he reported him as an addict to the division of narcotic
enforcement giving his name, age, address, and dose; one
and a half grains of morphine sulphate daily. (3) A similar
report was madt' on November 15 with reference to Mrs. S
after having already prescribed 180 doses for ber subseqnent
to October 13. His failure to keep records and to make reports
on both of these parties constituted violations of section 11395
and sufficed to justify the inferences of violations of that
statute. (4) He preseribed twice for H. suspicious that be
was an addict, before dismissing him. (5) He delayed reporting
his prescriptions to the division of narcotic enforcement 'for
quite some time.' (6) As further light upon bis intent.
Jll'titioner prescribed for a Mrs. P. not mentioned in I:'it hpr
count of the accusation. after being apprised b~' the
ilh·ision of her addiction. Sh(' claimed to suffer from art h- .
ritis. gall stones and spinal arthritis. He gave ber '20 dilaudid.
one half g-rains.' (7) In order to have a supply for his offi('e
he wrote prescriptions for morphine for his mother who
served as his nnrse.
"The board wa~ not only entitled, but was required. to
consider sl1ch (·jrcnmstan('('l': in determining wht'thf'r petitioner
acted in good faith and hont>stly believed that each of the
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addicts in question was '!Iufi'ering from incurable disease as
well as from addiction. While the testimony of petitioner was
direct and although he was the onl~' person who could testify
as to the thoughts be entertained, yet the circumstances par·
ticularized by him 88 well a.c; thOR!> given by Doctors Moulton
and Alden and by tbt' special ag!>nts of the board, and bis
persistency in prescribing morphine for addicts when it could
serve no purpose save that of gratifying appetites for the
narcotic-these circumstances justify the inference of un·
professional conduct on the part of petitioner. And if in
the minds of the members of the board such inferences out·
weighed the direct testimony of petitioner, the board was
acting within its lawful discretion in suspending his license."
It is hardly necessary at this time to argue the importance
of the functions of the Board of Medical Examiners or the
necessity of curbing the traffic in narcotics. The board, a
body of 10 experienced physicians, interprett'd the facts in tht'
light of their professional training and experience, and
determined that the condition of the addicts did not justify
petitioner's supplying them with narcotics. The Legislature
vested the board with power to make such determinations by
virtue of its specialized e:xperienct'. and thi!; court b88 recog·
nized that the "findings of tht' board comt' befort' the court
with a strong presumption of their correctness." (Drummey v.
•(;fiatt Board of Puneral Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75, 85 [87 P.2d
R481: Dare v. Board of Med,:cal Examinerll. 21 Cal.2d 790.
798 [136 P.2d 304) ; Sippe,. v. Urban, 22 Cal.2d 138, 144 [137

P.2d 425].)
Edmonds. J .. and Spence .•J .. eoncurred.
Defendants and appel1ants' petition for a rehf>llring was
denied August 26. 194f1 Erlmonds, J., Traynor, d., and
Spence, J., voted for a rehearing.

